bsips/bsip-0040.md

BSIP: 0040
Title: Custom active permissions
Authors:
  Alex Megalokonomos <https://github.com/clockworkgr>
  Fabian Schuh <https://github.com/xeroc>
  Stefan Schießl <https://github.com/sschiessl-bcp>
Status: Draft
Type: Protocol
Created: 2018-07-25
Discussion: https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-core/issues/1061
Worker: <Id of worker proposal>

Abstract

Strengthening user security is one of the main factors to elevate BitShares. In light of recent hacking and phishing attempts this becomes even more important. The need for a more sophisticated account security preceeded the idea for a finer-grained control of account permissions. We propose to add an additional authority to the account, called Custom Active (Permission). The permission contains a list of operationid-to-authority mappings that each grant access to the respective operation as if it were the active permission of the account. Additionally, the arguments of said operation can be restricted.

Motivation

Any successfull hacking or phishing attempt on any of the web wallets that are powered by the BitShares Blockchain is bad publicity. The user needs to be educated in account security, and this BSIP aims to ensure all technical possibilities are met while being flexible to allow many use-cases.

Examples:

• Witness Key: Only allows update signing key and publish price feed
• Trading Key: Only allows limit orders (arguments restricted to desired markets), update margin position and transfers (arguments restricted to certain accounts)
• Proposal Update Key: Approve proposals (2FA comes to mind)
• Faucet Key: Allow only to create accounts
• Withdrawal Key: Allow another account to transfer funds to himself
• Cold Storage Key: Only allow to move funds to the Hot Wallet

The above list of named keys is nothing that is known to the backend as the backend should have an abstract implementation. The UI could provide a button "Create Trading Key" that properly configures the respective custom active permission entry.

Rational

The description here is more on a superficial level and no recommendation how it can best be implemented. Custom active permission is a list of custom active authorities. A custom active authority contains an operation_id, an authority (just like with active permission) and asserts than can be used to restrict arguments and is only valid a certain time period (valid_from and valid_to). When a signed transaction arrives at the backend iterate the required accounts for each operations. If they have any one custom active authority that matches the given operation, signature and passes all asserts of the custom active authority, then the active authority of the required account is granted. This search can be stopped after finding one match.

A custom_active_permission looks like follows (in JSON for clarification, backend serializes and stores in a different way):

custom_active_permission = list of custom_active_authority items
custom_active_authority = {
    valid_from, // this custom active authority is valid starting at this timestamp, defaults to now
    valid_to,   // this custom active authority is valid until this timestamp, defaults to 1 year
    operationid,
    authority,
    asserts
}

Note: This assumes custom_active_permission is stored within account_object. Actual implementation details left to the implementer.

The asserts is a list of assert_objects that are all together evaluated with and logic to evaluate a match

asserts = list of assert_object
assert_object = {
    argument, // target argument of the operationid
    function, // functionid to do the assert 
    data,     // stores data specific to the chosen function
    state     // if this assert is statefull
}

List of possible asserts are:

function	data	state
any	[list, of, allowed, values]	stateless
range	[min, max]	stateless
length	[min, max]	stateless
limit	[value, interval_in_sec]	[current_cumsum, interval_began]
limit_monthly	[value, interval_in_months]	[current_cumsum, interval_began]

All asserts apply to int, string and object_ids. There is no type converstion, incompatible type means assert failure. Any more sophisticated data types are not included yet. The length assert is specific to string, whereas range, limit and limit_monthly is only applicable to int.

Example A: Assume account A and B and some unrelated key K. Furthermore A has a custom active authority in the following way:

custom active authority = {
    valid_from: 7.7.2018 00:00
    valid_to: 8.7.2018 00:00
    operationid: transfer,
    authority: {
       threshold: 1
       key_auth: [K, 1]
       account_auth: []
    },
    asserts: [
        {
            argument: to
            function: any,
            data: [B]
        }
    ]
}

That has the consquence now that a a transfer transaction sending funds away from A can be signed with key K as long as the receiver is B.

Specifications

Requirements to modify the backend includes

• Extend the account object to store custom active permission that includes a list of custom active authorities. Multiple custom active authority entries are possible for one operation
• Extend account_update or create a new operation to allow changing the custom active permission
• Operation-specific authorities (if present) must be evaluated in incoming transactions
• Additional committee parameters may be needed to limit the extend of usage of this feature

Notes: The implementation must not differentiate the logic, all operations receive the same.

Milestones

We propose do split the implmentation into two milestones:

1. Implementation of basic functionaliy to allow custom active permissions and authorities, including range, length and any asserts
2. Evaluation of stateful asserts (performance) and if positive, implementation of limit and limit_monthly asserts

This approach allows as well to add other asserts at a later stage (with a new BSIP).

Discussion

To be found in the issue.

Summary for Shareholders

Bad publicity in terms of security can have very negative effect on the BTS value. This BSIP allows that traders can e.g. use a trading key, witnesses can use their witness key and a faucet can use a faucet key. If then for some reason the key or witness/faucet server becomes compromised, such a key can do little harm to the account holders, minimizing the risk.

This BSIP opens up a lot of use-cases as presented in Motivation section. The intention is to not alter any existing logic of the permission system, which reduces the risk of malfunctioning.

Copyright

This document is placed in the public domain.