2015-12-16 11:00:54 +00:00
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BSIP: 0005
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Title: Expiring Votes for Witnesses
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Authors: Daniel Larmier <Dan@cryptonomex.com>
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2015-12-17 12:24:20 +00:00
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Fabian Schuh <Fabian@BitShares.eu>
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2015-12-30 08:49:38 +00:00
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Status: Deferred
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2015-12-16 11:00:54 +00:00
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Type: Protocol
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Created: 2015-12-16
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Discussion: <https://github.com/cryptonomex/graphene/issues/265>
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<https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,18109.0.html>
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Worker: tbd
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# Abstract
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Votes for witnesses are a measure of reputation in that they cast a persistent
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opinion - so not like votes in the traditional sense of the word. The
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witness voting system is currently designed to ensure stability by directing
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the apathetic to vote for incumbents. Whilst this may have advantages, it
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seems to present the danger that incumbents are likely to attain a
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near-unassailable position (excepting of course those who exhibit negligent/bad
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behaviour).
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# Motivation
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If the aim is the create an autocracy - albeit seeded by the active witnesses
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or so original gainers of significant 'reputation' - then this is fine. However,
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it would seem to discourage serious efforts to try and break into the active
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circle by newcomers with much to contribute. At the end of the BitShares 1
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network, circa. 220M votes were required and a quick browse of the delegates
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showed that with a few notable exceptions, the majority have been in place since
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a 4 or 5 digit block number - have all been of these current, active contributors?
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# Specifications
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2015-12-21 13:17:02 +00:00
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A blockchain parameter can be added that enforces a minimal *freshness* to votes
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2015-12-16 11:00:54 +00:00
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that are counted and handle cases of lost keys or apathetic votes hanging
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around.
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2015-12-21 13:17:02 +00:00
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# Discussion
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## Linear, Exponential, or other decay
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The question is left open whether the *freshness* of votes decreases linearily,
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exponentially or by any other function. It is further not defined if the
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decrease should scale with the number of blocks or the absolute time.
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## Voter Apathy
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The argument has been raised that a apathy of voters would result in only few
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*active* votes which could leave the blockchain open to attacks with only little
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stake.
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2015-12-28 08:36:18 +00:00
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## Highly Volatile Voting Power
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This proposal results in a high volatilty in voting power which has mostly
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negative effects when votes are removed from the actively voting stake, i.e. a
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big stake (e.g. from a proxy) expires. This could result in significant changes
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that take effect instantly.
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An alternative approach to fix this would be to have a window (e.g. several
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days) in which changes in votes take effect gradually.
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2015-12-16 11:00:54 +00:00
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# Copyright
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This document is placed in the public domain.
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2015-12-28 08:36:18 +00:00
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# See Also
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* https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,20753.0.html
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