2015-12-28 11:23:49 +00:00
|
|
|
BSIP: 0009
|
|
|
|
Title: Benefit Society
|
|
|
|
Authors: Fabian Schuh <Fabian@BitShares.eu>
|
|
|
|
Daniel Larimer <dan@cryptonomex.com>
|
|
|
|
Status: Draft
|
|
|
|
Type: Protocol
|
|
|
|
Created: 2015-12-16
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Abstract
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This proposal allows individuals to form *benefit societies* on the BitShares
|
|
|
|
blockchain.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A benefit society, fraternal benefit society or fraternal benefit order is a
|
|
|
|
society, an organization or a voluntary association formed to provide mutual
|
|
|
|
aid, benefit, for instance insurance for relief from sundry difficulties.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Motivation
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The premise of this feature is to be an organizational tool for groups of
|
|
|
|
individuals working toward a common cause. The benefit of implementing this in a
|
|
|
|
decentralized business (e.g. on a blockchain) is to enable the formation of of
|
|
|
|
benefit societies that may be difficult or impossible to operate in the
|
|
|
|
traditional manner.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Prior to blockchain technology any attempt to set up such a cooperative society
|
|
|
|
would get shut down. The resources pooled by the members would be seized. The
|
|
|
|
creation of such an organization would involve incorporating a business or
|
|
|
|
nonprofit with the permission of the government. Such an organization would
|
|
|
|
become a "single target" that was far easier to attack than going after all of
|
|
|
|
its members individually. If you attempted to create such an organization
|
|
|
|
without incorporating then individual members would have incentive to defect
|
|
|
|
when they are needed (it would be the prisoner's dilemma all over again).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Now that we have blockchain technology we can create a system where the
|
|
|
|
individual members cannot "defect" because all funds are managed by smart
|
|
|
|
contracts. Meanwhile, the government would not have a single target to attack
|
|
|
|
and take down the entire operation by stealing the reserves. Taking down this
|
|
|
|
system would have to go after all of the members individually which we have already
|
|
|
|
established as being politically inviable.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Rational
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The Prisoner's Dilemma
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As a society we are caught in what is known as the prisoner's dilemma. The
|
|
|
|
prisoner's dilemma is a canonical example of a game analyzed in game theory that
|
|
|
|
shows why two purely "rational" individuals might not cooperate, even if it
|
|
|
|
appears that it is in their best interests to do so. Here is an example of the
|
|
|
|
prisoner's dilemma:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Two freedom fighters are arrested, but prosecutors lack sufficient evidence to
|
|
|
|
convict them on the principal charge with a 2 year prison sentence. The
|
|
|
|
prisoner's hope to get sentenced to a lesser charge with just a 1 year prison
|
|
|
|
sentence. So the prosecutor offers each of them a deal, if they turn on the
|
|
|
|
other then they will be set free. So the options are as follows:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
They both turn on each other and get a 2 year sentence They remain loyal and
|
|
|
|
both get a 1 year sentence One of them defects, and gets set free leaving the
|
|
|
|
other to rot in jail for 2 years
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Discussion
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
It is implied that the prisoners will have no opportunity to reward or punish
|
|
|
|
their partner other than the prison sentences they get, and that their decision
|
|
|
|
will not affect their reputation in the future. Because betraying a partner
|
|
|
|
offers a greater reward than cooperating with him, **all purely rational
|
|
|
|
self-interested prisoners would betray the other**, and so the only possible
|
|
|
|
outcome for two purely rational prisoners is for them to betray each other.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Solution
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To break the cycle of violence and passive acceptance we must change the rules
|
|
|
|
of the game and **offer incentives for people to cooperate** for mutual self
|
|
|
|
defense. What if the freedom fighters had a policy of paying for the legal
|
|
|
|
defense of its members and compensating them for any time spent in prison?
|
|
|
|
Under such a system, the incentive to defect would be dramatically reduced. It
|
|
|
|
would be completely eliminated if defection disqualified a member from future
|
|
|
|
benefits. This would leave the following potential outcomes:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Neither defect, and both members are paid to spend 1 year in jail One defects,
|
|
|
|
goes free, but loses protection of his fellow activists, and the other is paid
|
|
|
|
to spend 2 years in jail. Both defect, both spend two years in jail, and
|
|
|
|
neither get paid.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The rational actor under these choices will risk 1 paid year in jail rather than
|
|
|
|
2 unpaid years.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# How Benefit Society Work
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Commit to supporting others within a society
|
|
|
|
2. Vote on which people qualify for help according to your societies policy
|
|
|
|
3. Give your pre-committed funds to authorized requests for help
|
|
|
|
4. Request help from the society when a qualifying event happens in your life
|
|
|
|
5. Receive donations from the members of the society you have supported
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Each month you publicly commit funds to be given to other members of your
|
|
|
|
society. These funds are held in a Smart Contract that will only allow them to
|
|
|
|
be given to other members of your society with approval by a large minority (3%)
|
|
|
|
of the society.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When a member experiences an unexpected burden they request help from their
|
|
|
|
society. Members of the society will then vote to approve or reject the request.
|
|
|
|
If the request is approved then individuals with pre-committed funds may choose
|
|
|
|
to give to their cause. The more you give to a society, the more it will give
|
|
|
|
back to you many times over.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Specifications
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This proposal will not change any existing behavior on the BitShares blockchain
|
|
|
|
and only adds new operations, states and smart contracts. Furthermore, all
|
|
|
|
parameters given as suggestions can be chosen individually for each society and
|
|
|
|
are voted for within each society.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Overview
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Every member of a society commits money to their own individual gift reserve on
|
|
|
|
a regular basis to earn *karma* in that particular society. The ultimate
|
|
|
|
strategy for an individual is to contribute money on a monthly basis so that he
|
|
|
|
or she can maintain their desired level of karma.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
By adding money to this gift reserve the user is committing to
|
|
|
|
donate that money to future claims of **other** members of the society and the
|
|
|
|
blockchain enforces that the money can only be used for that cause.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A claim must be verified by one or more elected oracles of the society. Oracles
|
|
|
|
are elected via karma weighted votes. Users can either be their own Oracle
|
|
|
|
(voting themselves) or they can delegate their power to someone else. Oracles
|
|
|
|
can vote for or against a claim and their vote is used **only** to certify the
|
|
|
|
facts of the claim are true. Among those facts are things like the person making
|
|
|
|
the claim is the owner, that they are in good standing, and that they had
|
|
|
|
sufficient karma at the time of the event in question.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To have a claim "approved" it must have a net positive vote greater than the
|
|
|
|
total karma held by the top 10 individual accounts by total karma. This measure
|
|
|
|
is designed to be high enough to prevent obvious fraud, but low enough that it
|
|
|
|
doesn't require every oracle to review and approve of every case.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Once approved by the oracles it is up to individual members of the society to
|
|
|
|
transfer funds from **their** individual gift reserve to the individual in
|
|
|
|
question. This ultimately means that even if the oracle is "gamed", you must
|
|
|
|
still convince the users with money to give it to your claim. This is the final
|
|
|
|
check on the system and ensures that manipulating the voting for qualification
|
|
|
|
is independent of actually receiving a payout. In the end, all an oracle can do
|
|
|
|
is give a recommendation and prevent spam.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When a user chooses to fund a claim they receive karma for every dollar
|
|
|
|
they give to someone who has filed a claim. This is designed to incentivise
|
|
|
|
individuals to actually pay out claims rather than just lock up money in their
|
|
|
|
gift reserve. This karma have no vesting requirements because the funds in
|
|
|
|
the gift reserve vested along with the karma earned.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Karma
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When a user contributes to a society they earn Karma in that society. Karma is
|
|
|
|
what qualifies a user to receive benefits from that society. Karma fades over
|
|
|
|
time if a user does not maintain regular donations. The default half life for
|
|
|
|
Karma is about 6 months. This means that giving a fixed amount every month will
|
|
|
|
eventually result in a maximum Karma level around 10 times the monthly
|
|
|
|
contribution.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
![Karma over time](bsip-0009/karma.png)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If after 12 months of consistent contributions a member stops making
|
|
|
|
contributions their Karma will gradually fall off, but will never quite hit 0.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
![Karma over time with exit after 6 months](bsip-0009/karma-exit.png)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Karma is also what gives members voting power over which requests for help are
|
|
|
|
qualified and which ones are not. Members earn half their Karma at the time
|
|
|
|
they contribute to their gift account and the other half of their Karma at the
|
|
|
|
time they allocate their gift to an approved request. In this way members are
|
|
|
|
encouraged to actively fulfill requests with their donations instead of letting
|
|
|
|
them accumulate for ever.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When a user files a request they use their Karma to request donations. There is
|
|
|
|
a ratio of the average donation received per Karma claiming donation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## States
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
We propose to add three new states to the protocol that need to be tracked and
|
|
|
|
evaluated:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* **Society State**:
|
|
|
|
* **Membership State**:
|
|
|
|
* **Request State**:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
### Society State
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-28 11:25:49 +00:00
|
|
|
| Field | Description |
|
|
|
|
| ------------------------ | ---------------------- |
|
|
|
|
| Name | Used to identify the society. The name can be any UTF-8 string up to 60 characters. |
|
|
|
|
| Description | Defines the high level purpose of the society |
|
|
|
|
| Creator | Account ID of the creator of this society. This account has permission to modify the |
|
|
|
|
| | properties of this society until the first membership account is funded and Karma has |
|
|
|
|
| | been issued. After Karma has been issued, the creator permissions are set to the top P |
|
|
|
|
| | membership accounts by total Karma vote. |
|
|
|
|
| nControl | The number of members who have joint control over the creator account. |
|
|
|
|
| Decay Rate | Defines the rate at which karma in a society decays (% per day) |
|
|
|
|
| Karma Ratio | Defines the amount of karma each member earns per BTS of commitment |
|
|
|
|
| Vesting Period | Defines the rate in seconds at which Karma vests |
|
|
|
|
| URL | Defines a URL where more information about the society can be found |
|
|
|
|
| Total Karma | Tracks the total karma issued to all members of this society |
|
|
|
|
| Approval Threshold | The percent of karma voting required to approve a payment request |
|
|
|
|
| Total Approved Requests | The total amount of Karma that has been approved for donations, this number can be |
|
|
|
|
| | calculated by summing the requests |
|
|
|
|
| Total Payouts | Total BTS given to active requests. |
|
|
|
|
| Charity Percent | The percent of donations that may be given to charity requests |
|
|
|
|
| Active Charity Requests | The number of active charity requests that are allowed. The top N charity requests |
|
|
|
|
| | by Karma approval voting may receive donations from member's charity account. |
|
2015-12-28 11:23:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
### Membership State
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Field | Description |
|
|
|
|
| ------------------------- | ------------------------ |
|
|
|
|
| Membership ID | Unique Identifier for this Membership |
|
|
|
|
| Account ID | The BTS account which has control over this Membership |
|
|
|
|
| Society ID | The society this membership is a part of |
|
|
|
|
| Total BTS Given | Tracks the life-time total of how much BTS has flowed through this membership |
|
|
|
|
| Membership BTS | BTS held in reserve that may only be given to other members |
|
|
|
|
| Charity BTS | BTS held in reserve that may be given to charity or other members |
|
|
|
|
| Karma | Current Karma within this society |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
### Request State
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Field | Description |
|
|
|
|
| ------------------------- | ------------------------ |
|
|
|
|
| Membership ID | The society member making the request |
|
|
|
|
| Subject | An 80 character title for the request |
|
|
|
|
| Summary | A brief summary of the request |
|
|
|
|
| Details | A detailed description of the request |
|
|
|
|
| Karma Committed | The total Karma being being used by this request |
|
|
|
|
| Total Karma For | The total amount of Karma voting to approve this request |
|
|
|
|
| Total Karma Against | The total amount of Karma voting against this request |
|
|
|
|
| Total BTS Received | The total BTS that has been given to this request |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## New Operations
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* *Create Society* - This operation is similar to create asset. It defines a new
|
|
|
|
society including a name, description, and any configurable parameters.
|
|
|
|
* *Join Society* - This operation ties an existing BitShares account to a
|
|
|
|
particular society and defines any relevant information associated with
|
|
|
|
society membership. This information may include the user's real name, age,
|
|
|
|
location, etc.
|
|
|
|
* *Commit Funds to Society* - This operation will transfer BTS from an account
|
|
|
|
to a society membership. It may be performed by any account. 1% of the BTS
|
|
|
|
transferred will be paid to the BTS reserve pool, 2% of the BTS transfered
|
|
|
|
will be allocated to the referral program, and 2% of the BTS transferred will
|
|
|
|
be used to buy back a Fee Backed Asset dedicated to this feature. The
|
|
|
|
society membership will earn Karma within the society proportional to the BTS
|
|
|
|
contributed.
|
|
|
|
* *Request Payout from Soceity* - This operation will create a payout request. A
|
|
|
|
payout request includes Karma from the membership account requesting the
|
|
|
|
payout and requires permission of the membership owner. The request includes a
|
|
|
|
subject, summary, and detailed description explaining the justification.
|
|
|
|
* *Update Payout Request* - This operation can be used to update mutable
|
|
|
|
properties of an existing payout request.
|
|
|
|
* *Approve or Reject Payout Request* - This operation is used to vote for or
|
|
|
|
against paying out a particular request. Each member of a society can vote
|
|
|
|
with a weight equal to the amount of karma the account has earned.
|
|
|
|
* *Update Membership Info* - This operation is used to update mutable membership
|
|
|
|
information such as nominating a proxy to vote on your behalf. This is
|
|
|
|
designed to simplify the amount of voting the average member must worry about.
|
|
|
|
* *Fund Payout Request* - This operation will transfer BTS held in the
|
|
|
|
membership account reserve to an approved payout request.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Maintenance Operations
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The following actions will be performed during a maintenance interval block
|
|
|
|
(e.g. once a day):
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Tally all relevant votes
|
|
|
|
2. Update management account authority for each society
|
|
|
|
3. Update management account authority for the fee backed asset
|
|
|
|
4. Decay all Karma by the configured percentage
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Smart Contract
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A smart contract will be integrated that will deal with the new operations,
|
|
|
|
derive the members karma and execute the proposals protocol as defined above.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Charity Program
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Every day there is need for money for individuals and charitable organizations
|
|
|
|
that haven't paid into the system. These individuals often get significant
|
|
|
|
organic donations to their cause. By allocating a portion of all funds
|
|
|
|
contributed to those high-profile victims the network can also gain good will
|
|
|
|
and free advertising. A suggested rate of 5% of all gifts should be allocated to
|
|
|
|
non-contributing high-profile needs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Referral Program, Fees and Monetization of this Proposal
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
All insurance-like systems depend upon having a large number of people pooling
|
|
|
|
risk. The more people involved the more evenly the risk is spread and the more
|
|
|
|
money there is available for funding claims. All insurance companies must charge
|
|
|
|
enough to cover not only the claims made, but also the advertising campaigns
|
|
|
|
that they run continuously on TV and Radio stations across the country.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A peer to peer society systems demands a decentralized, peer-to-peer
|
|
|
|
advertising campaign. This means that part of every dollar contributed toward
|
|
|
|
helping others is paid the person who referred you to the program. Everyone
|
|
|
|
paying into the system benefits from funding marketing campaigns targeted at
|
|
|
|
finding new users. A suggested rate of 10% of all gifts are paid to your
|
|
|
|
referrer until you become a life time member and qualify for referring others.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
We propose to distribute the fees as follows: A donation (i.e. funding of the
|
|
|
|
personal gift reserve) of 100 BTS results in 5 BTS in fee. Of this 5 BTS fee,
|
|
|
|
the usual 20% go to the BitShares shareholders as burned shares and the other
|
|
|
|
80% are management fees. These are given 50%/50% to the holders of a
|
|
|
|
society-specific [fee backed asset](bsip-0007.md) and the referral program.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
![Fee distribution](bsip-0009/fee-dist.png)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Applications
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Injustice Sharing
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Injustice occurs anytime an innocent person is harmed by the government or
|
|
|
|
anyone else. In this case, innocent means someone who has not committed fraud
|
|
|
|
nor initiated aggression against someone else. This means that everyone accused
|
|
|
|
of a victimless crime is suffering an injustice.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In the most general sense injustice is not always black and white and varies in
|
|
|
|
the eyes of every individual. Some people would see drunk driving as initiating
|
|
|
|
aggression even if no one was actually hurt and no property was damaged. In
|
|
|
|
other words, some people subscribe to the theory that harm can be ascribed to
|
|
|
|
mere endangerment. If driving drunk increases the chances of harm by 5% then
|
|
|
|
the damage caused by driving drunk is 5% of the average damage caused people who
|
|
|
|
drive drunk and actually do harm people. Regardless of which stance you happen
|
|
|
|
to hold, it is clear that justice is subjective and therefore, so is injustice.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Some injustices are universal and endured by everyone. In these cases the cost
|
|
|
|
of sharing the injustice would equal the cost of everyone paying their own way.
|
|
|
|
One example that everyone suffers from is payroll taxes. Almost everyone suffers
|
|
|
|
from this and it is almost universally enforced.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The point of injustice sharing is to distribute the burden of injustice that is
|
|
|
|
somewhat randomly or selectively applied to particular individuals. Examples of
|
|
|
|
this include regulatory violations, getting audited, traffic tickets, getting
|
|
|
|
caught with certain substances, copyright violations, asset forfeiture, etc. In
|
|
|
|
all of these cases there are thousands of people who escape the injustice for
|
|
|
|
every individual who is caught and suffers.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The primary goal of Injustice Sharing is to motivate individuals to commit to
|
|
|
|
helping one another in the face of injustice. What qualifies as injustice and
|
|
|
|
how much help each individual should receive and from whom is all subjective,
|
|
|
|
but this does not necessarily interfere with achieving the desired objective.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You motivate people to help one another by requiring them to commit money in
|
|
|
|
advance so that they can qualify for help from others. Then you only allow them
|
|
|
|
to allocate the money they have committed to other members when a qualified
|
|
|
|
injustice claim has been filed. Then you limit the maximum payout for a claim
|
|
|
|
to be a function of total funds committed by a user, total users who have filed
|
|
|
|
a claim, and the total amount paid out via claims. The exact equations will be
|
|
|
|
provided later.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Cooperation via Mutual Aid Society
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Prior to the welfare state individuals would organize in voluntary societies
|
|
|
|
where they would all contribute to helping one another. The amount of help
|
|
|
|
someone would receive from such a society depended upon how much they
|
|
|
|
contributed. Someone who contributed a lot would be helped a lot, whereas
|
|
|
|
someone expecting a handout would not get much help. In many ways these Mutual
|
|
|
|
Aid Societies were like insurance companies where the insured would directly
|
|
|
|
help each other with more than just money.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Before the government got involved and regulated them out of existence to be
|
|
|
|
replaced by modern insurance companies and the welfare state, the majority of
|
|
|
|
the population participated in one or more of these societies. People got the
|
|
|
|
help and care they needed at affordable costs without the need for violence.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I believe that it is through this type of organization that we can come together
|
|
|
|
as free men and women to defend our life, liberty, and property. Most government
|
|
|
|
abuses have a distribution among members of society similar to cancer. Most
|
|
|
|
people don't get it, but when you do the medical bills can bankrupt you. Like
|
|
|
|
cancer, some people have higher risks of getting caught and suffering as a
|
|
|
|
result but it can and does affect the most health conscious individuals. People
|
|
|
|
spend hundreds of dollars each month to defend themselves against health issues
|
|
|
|
that are less likely than becoming the victim of their own government.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Discussion
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## BTS denominated
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Funds given to your gift reserve are denominated in BTS (the core asset in
|
|
|
|
BitShares), a *volatile* currency. The question as to whether societies should
|
|
|
|
be allowed to be denominated in other assets is unanswered and requires further
|
|
|
|
discussion.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Preventing Fraud
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Like traditional insurance, measures must be taken to prevent fraud and equalize
|
|
|
|
risk. The most basic measure is that only the individual who contributed funds
|
|
|
|
can file a claim. This prevents selling the benefits of being a member to
|
|
|
|
someone after an society-covered event has occurred and payout is guaranteed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Next all claims must have their facts certified by one or more trusted (elected)
|
|
|
|
entities. These entities are responsible for verifying whether or not the claims
|
|
|
|
are accurate, complete, and whether the individual is currently in good standing
|
|
|
|
with the community. Good standing requires that individuals have no open claims
|
|
|
|
against them and have not harmed or defrauded anyone.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Once a claim has been approved and assigned a maximum payout, the other members
|
|
|
|
must choose to fund the claim from their own contributions. This means that
|
|
|
|
members must find sympathy within the community for their case. These other
|
|
|
|
members have funds pre-allocated that they can only spend funding claims. When
|
|
|
|
they do fund a claim, they gain extra "lottery tickets" which means that those
|
|
|
|
who fund claims can make larger claims than those who merely fund their policy
|
|
|
|
and never pay a claim. In a properly balanced "insurance" market that does not
|
|
|
|
build up a reserve, total income in any given month should equal the total
|
|
|
|
claims in that month. If a reserve is built up then either people are
|
|
|
|
over-paying or under claiming. Some reserve is useful because not all months are
|
|
|
|
equal, but the principle remains that on average today's income must equal
|
|
|
|
today's claims.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Users can be assured of payout anytime there are ample reserves because there
|
|
|
|
are more people looking to pay a claim than there are claims. In other words,
|
|
|
|
for every person with a claim there are 1000 people who are looking for someone
|
|
|
|
to help.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The result of this structure is that all payouts are governed by the subjective
|
|
|
|
approval of fellow users and all funds flow directly from one user to another.
|
|
|
|
This avoids the creation of a pool of funds held in a centralized location with
|
|
|
|
centralized decision making power. If most users don't want to support
|
|
|
|
reimbursement of a drunk driving ticket then the drunk driver may have a harder
|
|
|
|
time getting that covered than someone caught for a more sympathetic crime such
|
|
|
|
as whistle blowing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Unpleasant Societies
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This proposal adds a means to create arbitrary societies that follow a particular
|
|
|
|
*goal* or *motivation* that does not require shareholders' approval. Hence, we
|
|
|
|
may see societies that individual shareholders may find unpleasant, offensive or
|
|
|
|
disturbing. However, BitShares is dedicated to finding free market solutions to
|
|
|
|
secure life, liberty, and property to all and as such highly values freedom of
|
|
|
|
speech. Hence, it holds:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
> "I may not like your society, but I will defend your right to have it."
|
|
|
|
> -- Daniel Larimer
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Summary for Shareholders
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This proposal adds a new feature to BitShares that runs independently of other
|
|
|
|
features and requires [BSIP-0007](bsip-0007.md) to be implemented and available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The proposed feature allows to create and grow arbitrary mutual benefit
|
|
|
|
societies within the BitShares Decentralized Autonomous Company and probably
|
|
|
|
draws attention and fresh capital into BitShares.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Shareholders of BitShares profit from an increased exposure to the public,
|
|
|
|
increased usage of the platform and higher demand for BTS on external exchanges
|
|
|
|
and/or the internal decentralized exchange (assuming proper gateway
|
|
|
|
infrastructure).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The regulatory risks have been solved by letting BitShares, a decentralized
|
|
|
|
entity, execute the smart mutual aid contract and issue karma according to a
|
|
|
|
mathematical formula.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Since societies can be creates without shareholder approval, we may also face
|
|
|
|
negative PR created from societies that do not find much support among people.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Copyright
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This document is placed in the public domain.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# See Also
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,20640.0.html
|
|
|
|
* https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,20431.0.html
|