2.0 KiB
BSIP: 1204 (unassigned)
Title: Deterministic addresses for Stealth wallets
Authors: Christopher J. Sanborn
Status: Draft
Type: Informational
Created: 2018-01-29
Discussion: <url>
Abstract
To simplify a wallet owner's backup burden by documenting and standardizing key derivation for Stealth balances from the same backup seeds used to generate the user's regular account keys.
Motivation
Current wallet implementations (e.g. the CLI wallet and Agorise's extensions to the UI wallet) generate a new Brain Key for each Stealth "account" (defined as a confidential balance under the control of a single private key). Since creating a confidential account is a purely client-side activity, (in contrast with a regular account which is registered on the blockchain), there is no automatic association between a confidential balance and a regular account that ostensibly "owns" it, and a backup burden is created for each new confidential balance.
It would be desireable to give the user the ability to maintain all of her accounts and balances under the control of a single backup key seed or brain key, so that the backup burden can be satisfied just once, at the creation of the user's first regular account. The derivation schemes defined under Bitcoin's BIP-44 provide a natural mechanism for this, and Satoshi Lab's SLIP-48 already define derivation paths for owner, active, and memo keys on BitShares and similar networks.
We propose here:
(1) To define additional derivation paths for Stealth accounts, and,
(2) For backwards compatibility with existing accounts secured by Brain Key, to standardise and document a distinct procedure for deriving Stealth keys from Brain Keys so that the same Brain Key that secures a user's regular account can also be used to secure their confidential balances, if the user desires.
Rationale
Specifications
Discussion
Summary for Shareholders
Copyright
This document is placed in the public domain.