[bsip18] replace black swan by global settlement where applicable
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bsip-0018.md
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bsip-0018.md
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# Abstract
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BitAssets, i. e. market-pegged assets (MPA) like bitUSD in BitShares can suffer
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a "global settlement" event also known as "black swan". After global
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settlement, the asset is effectively rendered useless. This BSIP proposes a
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protocol change to enable resolving a global settlement so that affected assets
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can be continued and put to good use again.
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a "global settlement" event. After global settlement, the asset is
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effectively rendered useless. This BSIP proposes a protocol change to
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enable resolving a global settlement so that affected assets can be
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continued and put to good use again.
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# Motivation
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Market-pegged assets, aka SmartCoins are among the core features of the
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BitShares blockchain and as such provide one of our unique selling points.
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MPAs can suffer a "black swan" event. A black swan occurs when the least
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collateralized short position has insufficient collateral to buy back the
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borrowed SmartCoins at the current feed price. What happens then is that the
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MPA is tagged with a "settlement price", defined as the collateral ratio of the
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least collateralized short. All short positions are closed automatically, by
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collecting sufficient collateral into a settlement pool and paying out the
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remainder to the short's owners. MPA holders can use the forced settlement
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operation to receive their share from the settlement pool in exchange for their
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MPAs. Even after global settlement, market-pegged assets can still be
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MPAs can suffer a "global settlement" event. A global settlement occurs
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when the least collateralized short position has insufficient collateral
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to buy back the borrowed SmartCoins at the current feed price. What
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happens then is that the MPA is tagged with a "settlement price",
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defined as the collateral ratio of the least collateralized short. All
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short positions are closed automatically, by collecting sufficient
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collateral into a settlement pool and paying out the remainder to the
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short's owners. MPA holders can use the forced settlement operation to
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receive their share from the settlement pool in exchange for their MPAs.
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Even after global settlement, market-pegged assets can still be
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transferred or traded, but they can no longer be borrowed.
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Currently, in BitShares, there is no actual way to resolve the black swan, but
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eventually, all significant holders will have to settle their positions to
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obtain BTS for their black swan long position. Some dust will remain scattered
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all over the place, where the value of the dust position is lower than the fees
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required to get rid of it.
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Currently, in BitShares, there is no actual way to resolve the global
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settlement, but eventually, all significant holders will have to settle
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their positions to obtain BTS for their long position. Some dust will
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remain scattered all over the place, where the value of the dust
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position is lower than the fees required to get rid of it.
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# Rational
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When a market-pegged assets undergoes a black swan event, one of the crucial
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When a market-pegged assets undergoes a global settlement, one of the crucial
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mechanisms that support the peg (namely "margin calls") is no longer available.
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However, other mechanisms, such as the "face-value", trading and settlement
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still exist and, unless the valuation of BTS decreases significantly, the
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outstanding debt (the BitAsset long positions) are still collateralized by
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approximately 100% through the settlement pool at the fixed black swan price.
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approximately 100% through the settlement pool at the fixed settlement price.
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This means, if a black swan event happened on USD at a price of 1 bitUSD/BTS, then
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an outstanding debt of 1000 bitUSD would be backed by 1000 BTS in the
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settlement pool of the bitUSD asset and no other call positions would be open
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by anyone else. Every bitUSD long position could, in this case, claim BTS from
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the settlement pool at a rate of 1:1.
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This means, if a global settlement event happened on USD at a price of 1
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bitUSD/BTS, then an outstanding debt of 1000 bitUSD would be backed by
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1000 BTS in the settlement pool of the bitUSD asset and no other call
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positions would be open by anyone else. Every bitUSD long position
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could, in this case, claim BTS from the settlement pool at a rate of
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1:1.
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# Proposal
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@ -59,13 +61,14 @@ All that is needed for the asset to be *revived* is:
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* empty the settlement pool
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* re-enable price feeds
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Since after a black swan, the collateral for the outstanding long positions are
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stored in the settlement pool, we here propose to **obtain the funds in the
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settlement pool and it's outstanding debt from the network**. Since the
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collateral ratio of the settlement pool after a black swan is 100%, obtaining
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the settlement funds in order to convert it into an open call position
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**requires to also provide additional collateral or reduce the debt** in order
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to not cause another black swan or margin call right away.
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Since after a global settlement, the collateral for the outstanding long
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positions are stored in the settlement pool, we here propose to **obtain
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the funds in the settlement pool and it's outstanding debt from the
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network**. Since the collateral ratio of the settlement pool after a
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global settlement is 100%, obtaining the settlement funds in order to
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convert it into an open call position **requires to also provide
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additional collateral or reduce the debt** in order to not cause another
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global settlement or margin call right away.
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# Specifications
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@ -95,8 +98,8 @@ The operation works as follows:
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3. It reduces the account's balance by `collateral`.
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The collateral is used to initially support the accounts' call position.
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However, technically, only little additional collateral is required (if the
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valuation of the collateral hasn't change since the black swan event) if the
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owner accepts a margin call.
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valuation of the collateral hasn't change since the global
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settlement) if the owner accepts a margin call.
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4. The global settlement flag is removed from the asset.
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5. The asset is re-enabled such that price feeds can be produced again.
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6. After sufficient price feeds, the asset can be borrowed again.
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@ -112,12 +115,13 @@ The required checks for the operation are:
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## Sufficient Collateral
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Given that at the time of claiming the settlement funds, the blockchain cannot
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know the valuation of the collateral, the user needs to ensure that sufficient
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collateral is provided to support the call position **after** the price feeds
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are refreshed. Otherwise, the asset will either experience another black swan
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event right away, or the call position will be margin called.
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In any way, it is up to the user of the above operation to take that risk.
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Given that at the time of claiming the settlement funds, the blockchain
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cannot know the valuation of the collateral, the user needs to ensure
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that sufficient collateral is provided to support the call position
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**after** the price feeds are refreshed. Otherwise, the asset will
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either experience another global settlement event right away, or the
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call position will be margin called. In any way, it is up to the user
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of the above operation to take that risk.
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## Partially Obtaining Settlement Funds
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@ -127,13 +131,13 @@ obtaining a fraction of the settlement pool.
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## BitAssets using BitAssets as collateral are unaffected
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One huge advantage of this approach is BitAssets that are collateralized by
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other BitAssets are not directly affected by this proposal. Even though the
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*economical debt* of such asset may be argued about if the collateral asset
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experienced a black swan event, the *technical debt* is unaffected. Converting
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the settlement pool into a regular call position through this proposal would
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not only restore the original BitAsset, but also reset the collateral of the
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derived BitAsset.
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One huge advantage of this approach is BitAssets that are collateralized
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by other BitAssets are not directly affected by this proposal. Even
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though the *economical debt* of such asset may be argued about if the
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collateral asset experienced a global settlement, the *technical debt*
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is unaffected. Converting the settlement pool into a regular call
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position through this proposal would not only restore the original
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BitAsset, but also reset the collateral of the derived BitAsset.
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## Committee funded BitAsset Recovery
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@ -144,8 +148,8 @@ to take the risk of using this operation that we would like to discuss. Keep in
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mind that
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* the valuation of the collateral may be volatile (e.g. in case of BTS)
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* after black swan, the long positions can settle and thus reduce the debt as
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well as the settlement pool
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* after global settlement, the long positions can settle and thus
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reduce the debt as well as the settlement pool
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Market participants that are willing to take risk may want to obtain a larger
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chunk of a settlement pool as it means an **instant short position**.
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# Summary for Shareholders
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This proposal presents a flexible way of reviving a BitAsset that has
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experienced a black swan event. The blockchain or shareholders do not need to
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take any risk as the proposal only offers a new way for market participants to
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(partially) revive the BitAsset.
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experienced a global settlement event. The blockchain or shareholders do
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not need to take any risk as the proposal only offers a new way for
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market participants to (partially) revive the BitAsset.
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# Copyright
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This document is placed in the public domain.
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