From 2ba34f167e010333fdfab2c5b9fe7bfc6804ce2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabian Schuh Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2017 13:02:22 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] [bsip18] updates --- bsip-0018.md | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/bsip-0018.md b/bsip-0018.md index 58c53f0..59fcda1 100644 --- a/bsip-0018.md +++ b/bsip-0018.md @@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ continued and put to good use again. # Motivation +The necessity of reviving bitassets has already been discussed in +BSIP-0017, and is unquestioned. + Market-pegged assets, aka SmartCoins are among the core features of the BitShares blockchain and as such provide one of our unique selling points. @@ -72,7 +75,43 @@ global settlement or margin call right away. # Specifications -## `obtain_settlement_funds_operation` +## Bugfix: MPAs that have seen a global settlement cannot be settled after the price feed expires + +It has turned out that force-settling an MPA requires a valid price feed +even when the MPA has a `settlement_price` set. This is clearly a bug, +since in that case the settlement price is independent from the price +feed. Furthermore, publishing price feeds is no longer possible after a +global settlement, so the time when settlement is possible at all is +limited to the expiration period of the price feed of the MPA. + +This bug will be fixed. See +https://github.com/cryptonomex/graphene/issues/664#issuecomment-254056746 +for a discussion. + +## Auto-revive empty bitassets + +A bitasset is "empty" if nobody is holding a positive amount of it +anymore. The only reasonable exception to this rule is the pool of +accumulated fees belonging to the asset itself. This situation can occur +after all holders of a globally settled asset have settled their +position via forced settlement. + +The emptiness of a bitasset can easily be determined. When the BitAsset is +empty, the remainder of the settlement fund will be paid out to the +issuer, the accumulated fees and the current supply are reset to zero, +and the settlement price is cleared. + +## `bid_settlement_funds_operation` + +This applies only to SmartCoins, not to Prediction Markets. + +The idea of turning the settlement fund into a short position when its +value has increased sufficiently can easily be extended. If the value of +the settlement fund itself is not sufficient to create a sufficiently +collateralized short position (in terms of price feed and MCR), an +investor could volunteer to add the required amount of collateral to the +fund and take ownership of the resulting short position +(collateral+debt). This operation is all that is needed empty the settlement pool and re-enable price feeds. It has the following payload: @@ -85,8 +124,6 @@ It has the following payload: of both. * `additional_collateral` (asset_type): Collateral paid by the account in order to support the call position - * `additional_debt` (asset_type): Debt that is paid by the account in order to reduce the - debt (while keeping the full settlement pool as collateral) * `obtain_settlement_funds` (asset_type): The amount of settlement funds the account is willing to obtain @@ -110,6 +147,14 @@ The required checks for the operation are: * Are funds in the settlement pool? * `debt` > 0 or `collateral` > 0 * `obtain_settlement_funds` <= `settlement_pool` + * the account has sufficient balance to cover `additional_collateral` + +If the checks are successful, a `call_order_object` belonging to the +investor will be created or updated as described above. Then, the +settlement price and `settlement_fund` will be cleared. + +The fee for this operation will be paid by the investor/recoverer. The +fee is equal to the fee of the `call_order_update` operation. # Discussion @@ -154,6 +199,22 @@ mind that Market participants that are willing to take risk may want to obtain a larger chunk of a settlement pool as it means an **instant short position**. +## Feeds + +Re-collateralization is deliberately not restricted to the issuer of the +globally settled bitasset. The intent here is to incentivize potential +investors. Effectively, during an uptrend in the value of the +collateral, this works like a reverse auction. A higher value of the +collateral results in a lower required amount for re-collateralization, +i. e. the chance/risk ratio increases. This incentive makes sense, +because additional collateral is in the best interest of the holders of +the settled BitAsset. + +This "reverse auction" ends when the BitAsset is auto-revived by +creating a short position for the issuer. At that point, an "investor" +could re-collateralize with zero risk, which is no longer in the +interest of the holders. + # Summary for Shareholders This proposal presents a flexible way of reviving a BitAsset that has @@ -162,4 +223,5 @@ not need to take any risk as the proposal only offers a new way for market participants to (partially) revive the BitAsset. # Copyright + This document is placed in the public domain.