Merge pull request #19 from pmconrad/bsip-0017
Bsip 0017, modifications and clarifications
This commit is contained in:
commit
208cb314af
1 changed files with 57 additions and 3 deletions
60
bsip-0017.md
60
bsip-0017.md
|
@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ the underlying asset has a settlement_price. For SWAN this is the case, so these
|
||||||
are resolved automatically after some time. Because "some time" can be quite
|
are resolved automatically after some time. Because "some time" can be quite
|
||||||
long though, it is better to resolve this in a quicker way.
|
long though, it is better to resolve this in a quicker way.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Resolution: cancel them all at the time of the black swan. This is a softfork.
|
Resolution: execute them all at the time of the black swan. This is a softfork.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### limit_order_object
|
### limit_order_object
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@ -124,9 +124,20 @@ revival none of these exist.
|
||||||
However, calls may exist with SWAN as collateral. Suppose that DUCK is an asset
|
However, calls may exist with SWAN as collateral. Suppose that DUCK is an asset
|
||||||
that is backed by SWAN. Calls on DUCK cannot be cancelled.
|
that is backed by SWAN. Calls on DUCK cannot be cancelled.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Resolution: Modify DUCK to be backed by BACK instead of SWAN. Modify all DUCK
|
Resolution 1: Modify DUCK to be backed by BACK instead of SWAN. Modify all DUCK
|
||||||
calls accordingly. Remove price feeds from DUCK.
|
calls accordingly. Remove price feeds from DUCK.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Resolution 2: Force-settle DUCK. This will free up all SWAN used as collateral
|
||||||
|
for DUCK, i. e. the SWAN will be returned into account_balance objects and
|
||||||
|
resolved as described below.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note that Resolution 2 is only available for MPAs, not for PMs, because PMs
|
||||||
|
don't have a price feed that can be used to determine the fair value of DUCK vs
|
||||||
|
SWAN in settlements.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Also note that Resolution 2 is recursive - if an asset SLUG exists that is
|
||||||
|
backed by SWAN, SLUG will have to be settled as well.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This solution requires further discussion.
|
This solution requires further discussion.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### vesting_balance_object
|
### vesting_balance_object
|
||||||
|
@ -239,6 +250,30 @@ event on an asset and the revival of that same asset. The parameter will be
|
||||||
modifiable by the committee and defaults to 4 weeks (28 days). See discussion
|
modifiable by the committee and defaults to 4 weeks (28 days). See discussion
|
||||||
below.
|
below.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Dependent MPAs
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If at the time of global settlement an MPA exists that is backed by the settled
|
||||||
|
asset, that dependent MPA is also settled.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Additionally, it will be forbidden to create assets backed by bitAssets that
|
||||||
|
have a settlement_price.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The reason for this is that after global settlement the settled asset is no
|
||||||
|
longer pegged to its "real" counterpart. For example, suppose that an asset
|
||||||
|
bitGOLD_USD exists that is supposed to represent the value of an amount of gold
|
||||||
|
and is backed by an amount of bitUSD (which is supposed to be pegged to the
|
||||||
|
US-Dollar). After bitUSD has suffered a black swan, bitUSD is no longer pegged
|
||||||
|
to USD. Instead, bitUSD represents a fixed amount of BTS, defined by the
|
||||||
|
settlement_price.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Supposedly, the price feed for bitGOLD_USD will continue to follow the gold
|
||||||
|
price in terms of US-Dollars, which will quickly deviate from the actual worth
|
||||||
|
of bitGOLD_USD, which is really defined by the BTS price at that time. This will
|
||||||
|
lead to confusion and anger among market participants. It is therefore
|
||||||
|
reasonable to put bitGOLD_USD into the same state of limbo as the backing USD.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This change requires further discussion.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Discussion
|
# Discussion
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## minimum_time_before_asset_revival
|
## minimum_time_before_asset_revival
|
||||||
|
@ -252,7 +287,7 @@ the resolution process that affects them.
|
||||||
## Dependent Assets
|
## Dependent Assets
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
As described above, assets may exist that use SWAN as collateral. Short
|
As described above, assets may exist that use SWAN as collateral. Short
|
||||||
positions in such assets must be resolved somehow. The proposed resolution is
|
positions in such assets must be resolved somehow. The proposed resolution 1 is
|
||||||
quite harsh, in that it modifies the asset that uses SWAN as collateral.
|
quite harsh, in that it modifies the asset that uses SWAN as collateral.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
It is reasonable insofar as SWAN effectively represents the value of a fixed
|
It is reasonable insofar as SWAN effectively represents the value of a fixed
|
||||||
|
@ -315,3 +350,22 @@ Not all shareholders need to understand the technical details of the proposal,
|
||||||
however, they should be aware of the implications of these changes. It is
|
however, they should be aware of the implications of these changes. It is
|
||||||
particularly important to understand how the revival of an asset affects the
|
particularly important to understand how the revival of an asset affects the
|
||||||
different parties, i. e. holders, shorters, traders and issuers.
|
different parties, i. e. holders, shorters, traders and issuers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
After an asset SWAN backed an asset BACK has seen global settlement, in order to
|
||||||
|
revive it all existing SWAN must be destroyed and their owners must receive a
|
||||||
|
share of the available collateral (BACK). In particular,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
0. At the time of the black swan, all outstanding settlement requests will be
|
||||||
|
filled, and all MPAs backed by SWAN will receive a global settlement as well.
|
||||||
|
1. At the time of revival, all open market orders concerning SWAN will be
|
||||||
|
cancelled (buys and sells).
|
||||||
|
2. Other MPAs backed by SWAN will be settled as well.
|
||||||
|
3. Other PMs backed by SWAN will be modified so that they are backed by BACK.
|
||||||
|
4. Vesting balances, genesis balances and account balances of SWAN will be turned
|
||||||
|
into respective balances of BACK.
|
||||||
|
5. Blinded balances of SWAN will receive special treatment so that they can be
|
||||||
|
withdrawn as BACK.
|
||||||
|
6. The SWAN fee pool will be zeroed out, and the issuer will receive the
|
||||||
|
remaining BACK collateral.
|
||||||
|
7. Finally, SWAN will be put into a state where the issuer can modify parameters
|
||||||
|
and eventually open it up for general use again.
|
||||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue