24 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
24 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
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BSIP: 1204 (unassigned)
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Title: Blockchain scanning for inbound Stealth transactions
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Authors: Christopher J. Sanborn
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Status: Draft
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Type: Protocol
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Created: 2018-01-29
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Discussion: <url>
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## Abstract
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A confidential (blind or stealth) transaction (CTXO) does not identify the recipient. As such, there is no direct way for a wallet to query the p2p network for inbound transactions. Instead, a wallet must either (a) inspect all CTXOs and test a challenge condition on each one, or (b) transmit to the p2p node some kernel of the challenge so that the p2p node can select an inclusive CTXO set. The latter option likely undermines unlinkability. At present, the WS API offers no mechanism for retrieving whole sets of CTXOs between certain block-height ranges, thus a wallet must know the Pedersen commitment of CTXO that they are interested in. This is the reason for transaction receipts. Lost or untransmitted receipts can result in lost funds. It is proposed that the Witness Node component be updated to (a) index not just the Pedersen commitments, but also the stealth memo and/or range proof fields of CTXOs, and (b) afford an API method to retrieve CTXOs in a specified block range, so that wallets can scan and identify inbound transactions. This will obviate the need for both receipt transmission and receipt storage by sender and recipient. The stealth memo format may also need updating to support challenge tests.
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## Motivation
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## Rationale
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## Specifications
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## Discussion
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## Summary for Shareholders
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## Copyright
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This document is placed in the public domain.
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## See Also
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